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THE PROPERTY RIGHTS DECISIONS OF JUSTICE
SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: WHEN PRAGMATIC
BALANCING IS NOT ENOUGH
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION: O'CONNOR's FIDELITY TO TRADITION

Any search for two words to characterize Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's judicial work over her distinguished twenty-five-year
Supreme Court career would quickly hone in on "pragmatism" and
"balancing." Justice O'Connor is "pragmatic" not because she displays any trace of personal opportunism, but because of her deep
institutional commitment to do what she can to promote the longterm stability of American political institutions under law. She believes in "balancing" because of her strong conviction that constant
attention to the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case help restrain a Justice from pushing legal doctrine too far in
one direction or another-again, in ways that might destabilize the
legal system. So constrained, Justice O'Connor does not give pride of
place to overarching theories in working out her particular decisions.
It would, however, be a serious mistake to treat her as a constitutional "minimalist" who wants to situate every case on its own bottom,1
for she does have a consistent philosophy. Instead, her primary concern is to preserve continuity with existing legal doctrinal structures,
which requires more fidelity to the past than any strong minimalist
view of constitutional law would require. The best way to think of
her work is as an effort to nudge the received judicial wisdom in her
preferred direction, without attacking the intellectual foundations
* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, The Peter
and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall Distinguished
Service Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago. My thanks
to Isaac Gruber, University of Chicago Law School, Class of 2012, for his usual excellent research assistance. This article is an extended version of comments that I delivered on this topic
at Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference in Beijing, China, sponsored by William &
Mary Law School and Tsinghua University held in Beijing, China on October 14 and 15, 2011.
My thanks to the many participants of the New York University School of Law Faculty for
their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper delivered on February 6, 2012.
1. For a discussion of this view, see, for example, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE ATA TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (2001).
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of the system as a whole. Put otherwise, she is comfortable-too
comfortable, in my view-with the United States' modern social
democratic state that relies on a firm public/private alliance that
simultaneously works for both sustained economic growth and a fair
distribution of wealth. Her frame of mind represents an updated
judicial version of Pax Eisenhower, with its winning campaign slogan of "Peace, Prosperity, and Progress." 2
There is much to be said for adopting this model. Its key trade-off
is to write off any large gains from major judicial intervention in

order to prevent major institutional shipwrecks borne of hasty and
irresponsible judicial intervention on matters in which courts have,

at most, imperfect knowledge. A former legislator, Justice O'Connor
is generally sympathetic to legislative schemes that memorialize
compromise settlements to complex problems. Her affection for balancing tests is like a gyroscope that prevents the ship of state from
lurching too far in one direction or the other. Put otherwise, Justice
O'Connor worked comfortably within the dominant tradition, without seeking to overturn it. That view carries over to her work in
property law, which for these purposes, I construe to cover the law
of takings and the collateral doctrines dealing with deprivations of
due process and impairment of contracts. The question is how to
evaluate her performance.
The inquiry merits a split decision. Armed with this general approach, she has produced, without question, some of the strongest
and most thoughtful Supreme Court decisions in the past decade.
Her decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.3 offers
as careful a demolition of aggressive administrative action as one
could hope to read. Her decision in Minneapolis Star and Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue 4 offers one of the best
defenses of the flat tax in the context of the First Amendment,
which easily could be generalized to cover all systems of taxation
on all forms of property.5 And her analysis of federalism in Gregory
2. See DWIGHT EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: 1953-1956, 484-85 (Doubleday,
1963) ("The slogan 'Peace, Prosperity, and Progress,' which was applied to the first-term
years, and was used in the campaign of 1956 .... ).
3. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,529 U.S. 120 (2000).
4. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
5. I attempt the latter in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 283-305 (1985).
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v. Ashcroft 6 offers perhaps the most thoughtful judicial commentary on matters of federalism. Her thoughtful opinion in New York
v. United States' breathed some much needed rigor into the vexed
relationship between the national and state sovereignty. That decision followed her powerful dissent in South Dakota v. Dole,8 which
turned on the distinction between encouragement and coercion in
the law of unconstitutional conditions and is a beacon of sense relative to the opinion for the Court prepared by Chief Justice Rehnquist.9
There are two common threads that link all these diverse opinions together. At first look, they may seem to be unrelated, but in
fact they are closely connected The first point is that in her strongest opinions Justice O'Connor was prepared to strike something
down. That simple task sharpens the intellect and allows her to use
her thinking cap. The reason these decisions work so well is that the
basic tradition in which she wrote calls for some higher level of scrutiny which allows her to turn her analytical powers to the hard questions put before her, without having to rock the Supreme Court's
constitutional boat.
The second point is that she tends to use that power on those
issues for which she cares about as a constitutional matter. That
point seems more or less true with respect to her First Amendment
decisions, where she cares about the role of political speech in society, and it is equally true in her administrative law opinions, where
she has some concern with the excess aggrandizement of administrative power. It is also evident in her federalism opinion, where her
history as a state legislator (who rose to be speaker of the Arizona
assembly) made her acutely aware of the dangers of the federal overreach with respect to matters that she thought rightly lay within
the control of the state, and which inspired some of her most incisive
and influential writing.
Yet exactly the opposite predilections are at work in the property
cases, where she tended (at least until Kelo) to give a large berth to
state and local government officials to regulate all aspects of local
land use law. Here the desire to respect these decisions of state and
6. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
7. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
8. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
9. I stoutly defend her federalism decisions in JudicialEngagement with the Affordable
Care Act: Why Rational Basis Analysis Falls Short, 19 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 931 (2012).
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local government officials leads her to embrace a world view in which
balancing is done in accordance with the rational basis test, where
the slightest state interest can resist the strongest private claims.
In this regard, Justice O'Connor's fidelity to tradition often does more
harm than good. In making this statement, I am well aware that on
some key issues, she has aligned herself with what might be called
the conservative majority on the court. She has sided with Justice
Antonin Scalia and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in their joint
effort to put some constitutional limitations on the common practice
of state local governments to demand exactions as the price for permitting new projects. For example, she concurred in Justice Scalia's
decision in Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission,1 0 which introduced the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions into the law of takings, and joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's effort in Dolan v. City of
Tigard " to place proportionality limitations on these exactions in
such a way as to limit their insidious scope. 1 2
Yet in the end, both of these efforts to constrain the machinations
of state and local governments proved to be failures as lower courts
have deployed a variety of devices to water down Nollan and Dolan,
so that today state and local governments routinely impose exactions with little fear of judicial invalidation.1 3 The same is true with
respect to her decision to join Chief Justice Rehnquist in FirstEnglish
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 1 4 where his
efforts to limit the scope of permanent partial takings did little or
nothing to tie the hands of local governments that sought to impose
strong delays on the development of property rights. Indeed, the
rule was largely eviscerated in Tahoe-SierraPreservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency." There, it seems likely that
10. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). For a generally supportive view
of Nollan, see Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1731 (1988).
11. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
12. For my discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and
Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479 (1995).
13. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996) (upholding financial exaction to be paid for additional public amenities). And on the procedural side, see
Williamson v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
14. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
15. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002) (sustaining a succession of temporary land use ordinances against a FirstEnglish
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Justice O'Connor joined the majority because the claimants raised
the bar so high as to say that any moratorium-no matter how shortconstituted a temporal taking for which compensation was required.1 6
The simple truth is that unless and until the Supreme Court revisits and reaffirms these decisions, lower courts will remain highly
deferential to state and local governments on all land use issues.
And that level of commitment on these issues is just not there.
This capsule summary helps identify the two systematic weakness of Justice O'Connor's pragmatic balancing. First, that approach
guarantees that she has no fire in the belly. Until her flawed-butinspired valedictory in Kelo v. City of New London,17 no property
rights case attracted her passion at the same level brought by the
Supreme Court in cases of racial segregation and police brutality
between, say, the New Deal Supreme Court and the early years of
the Burger Court, which are best understood as an extension of the
Warren Court.
The second weakness of her position is ultimately more important. Constitutional pragmatism and balancing all presuppose that
the correct way to address both legal doctrine and institutional practices is incrementally. But for that approach to make sense, the doctrine and practices have to be at or near the right place to begin with.
There are doubtless many areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence
that can regarded as more or less on the mark. I take that view on
the dormant commerce clause, which has done a world of good even
though it has somewhat porous textual foundations. 1 9 I think that
the same can be said of First Amendment's protection of public
attack). Justice O'Connor joined in Justice Stevens's opinion, leaving Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas in dissent.
16. Id. at 320 ("For petitioners, it is enough that a regulation imposes a temporary
deprivation-no matter how brief-of all economically viable use to trigger a per se rule that
a taking has occurred."). Indeed, there is no need to go that far. Another sensible reading
allows for "normal delays" that are commonly experienced, so long as these are cabined to a
relatively short time. See id. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For a defense of that line,
see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1081 (1999).
17. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See infra Part I.
18. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits as property rights);
Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing disparate impact tests in civil rights
litigation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (constitutional protection of abortion).
19. For a discussion, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Waste & the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 29 (1999).
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dissenting voices.2 0 But takings law is not in any shape to command
a level of judicial respect that it has not earned.
Five major decisions shaped this field prior to Justice O'Connor's
appearance on the Supreme Court. Block v. Hirsh21 bestowed extensive power on the state to impose rent control systems on real estate
leases. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 22 immunized virtually all zoning schemes from constitutional attack, except on some small-bore
issues.2 3 Home Mortgage Co. v. Blaisdell2 4 used an expansive reading
of the police power to cope with emergencies to truncate the constitutional protection from state regulation afforded to mortgagees,
chiefly banks and other financial institutions. Berman v. Parker2 5
gave local governments a wide berth to institute comprehensive
planning schemes without running afoul of the public use limitation
found in the Takings Clause. Penn Central Trans. Corp. v. City ofNew
York 2 6 relied on a famous three-part balancing test that softened
the protection that private property received against land use ordinances-in this instance, a landmark preservation statute. The last
two loom very large in Justice O'Connor's pantheon of decided cases.
There is one common element in all these decisions, which is their
willingness to show strong deference to the decisions of a government regulator-even when it trenches strongly on the rights of
private property and voluntary contract. The great vice of Justice
O'Connor's incrementalism is that she begins her deliberation, not
with a sound appreciation of how wrong these cases are as a matter
of first principle, but from her insistence on asking just how far she
can deviate from the current legal position without toppling the apple cart. The justices writing in the earlier cases were, of course, not
bound by any particular decision. Even if they were, they would
have been quite happy to move the yardstick in their preferred
direction without undue concern with stare decisis, constitutional
text, or constitutional theory. All these vices are evident in Justice
Brennan's facile opinion in Penn Central. The effect, therefore, of
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 1325 (1921).
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
Home Mortgage Co. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Penn Central Trans. Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Justice O'Connor's position is to entrench the worst in the Supreme
Court precedent, which thereby makes it more difficult to undo a
bad status quo in the next iteration. This tendency is, of course, not
confined to the property cases broadly conceived. It is also exemplified in Chief Justice Rehnquist's commerce clause opinion in United
States v. Lopez2 7 which further insulated the gigantic over-reading of
the commerce power in Wickard v. Filburn2 8 from much-needed
further scrutiny.2 9
The intellectual root of our current judicial disarray starts with
the wretched status quo ante when Justice O'Connor took her seat on
the Court in 1981. The dominant approach toward takings issues is
summed up by two words that appear nowhere in the Constitution,
but which dictate its across-the-board application: rational basis.
That test represents one of three flavors of constitutional review.
The most exacting form involves strict scrutiny, where the key assumption is that the error cost of letting bad legislation through is far
greater than the error cost of keeping good legislation off the books.
There are two types of error: the first can be termed Type I Error,
and the second is Type II Error. If Type I error is far more costly,
the law should opt for more Type II errors than Type I errors. We,
therefore, are trying to minimize the weighted sum of both types of
error, each with a distinctive weight n or m. The task is to minimize n(Type I) + m(Type II) where both n and m can be less than or
greater than one. Divide both sides through by m, so that the task
is to minimize the sum of (n/m)Type I + Type II. In a strict scrutiny
system, it is plausible, and perhaps even generous, by way of numerical illustration, to set n/m = 10. In intermediate scrutiny, that
ratio is surely lower. I think that it would not be a fair representation to assume that n/m = 1 in these cases, but is in fact greater than
1, which reflects the common perception that intermediate scrutiny
is closer to strict scrutiny than it is to the rational basis test, where
n/m < 1, which is to say, the error of keeping legislation off the books
is far greater than the error of letting it in. If that ratio equals 0.1,
strict scrutiny cashes out to be 100 times (10/0.1) as serious as
rational basis. No wonder it is a rare occasion when legislation is
27. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
28. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
29. For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, The FederalismDecisions of Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1793 (2006).
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upheld under strict scrutiny or struck down under rational basis. A
judicial chasm lies between the two approaches.
The Constitution is not explicitly equipped with any calipers that
indicate which standard of review should be used in which particular context. Those critical choices are left to the vagaries of constitutional interpretation. The questions involved in this circumstance,
therefore, are as follows. The first is whether or not the Supreme
Court (which is the only court whose view truly matters on this
issue) should utilize a uniform standard of review across each class
of constitutional claims. If the answer to that question is yes, what
standard ought to be applied? If the answer is no, which is manifestly the choice today, the next question is which constitutional
provisions receive what level of scrutiny, and why. Thus, in the
takings area, it seems quite clear that courts give greater scrutiny
to the question of what compensation is "just" than they give to the
question of whether a taking is for a particular matter of public use.
This contrast is made explicitly in the following passage:
There can, in view of the combination of those two words [just
and compensation], be no doubt that the compensation must be
a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken, and this just
compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property, and not to
the owner.... This [verbal formulation] excludes the taking into
account as an element in the compensation any supposed benefit
that the owner may receive in common with all from the public
uses to which his private property is appropriated, and leaves it
to stand as a declaration that no private property shall be appropriated to public uses unless a full and exact equivalent for it be
returned to the owner....
By this legislation, Congress seems to have assumed the right
to determine what shall be the measure of compensation. But
this is a judicial, and not a legislative, question. The legislature
may determine what private property is needed for public purposes; that is a question of a political and legislative character.
But when the taking has been ordered, then the question of compensation is judicial. It does not rest with the public, taking the
property through Congress or the legislature, its representative,
to say what compensation shall be paid, or even what shall be
the rule of compensation. The Constitution has declared that just
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compensation shall be paid, and the ascertainment of that is a
judicial inquiry.30
That persistent distinction, moreover, cannot be derived by any
textual inspection of the entire Takings Clause-"nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation"which reads, across the board, as a strict constraint on all government officials.
So which particular constitutional provisions should receive what
level of scrutiny? In the end, I can envision only one sound approach
to that challenge. The underlying principle runs in its simplest form
as follows: the higher the level of legislative or administrative malfunction, the greater the level of judicial scrutiny.3 That view was
articulated most forcefully in the late John Hart Ely's 1980 book,
Democracy and Distrust, whose title reveals its thesis.3 2 As stated,
this proposition does not take into account the abilities of the Supreme Court to discharge its ultimate function. Surely if the Court
were universally regarded as a corrupt institution, say, incorrigible as an Argentinean or Russian court, no one would pay fealty to
it. But no one remotely thinks that this is the case, so the question
of its competence goes into the balance in the form of question of
whether the disputed issue falls within the Supreme Court's institutional competence. At this point, the relative insulation of the judiciary from political forces means that there are few systematic
30. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326-27 (1893). Several
points are worthy of note here. First, in Monongahela, there was never any real question of
whether the locks involved in that case were for public use, so that the sentence in question
only refers to the fact that the legislature has the power to decide which public works project to
initiate. The taking for private use issue is just not raised. Second, the reference that the compensation is "for the property, and not to the owner" is used here to indicate that there is no
setoff to the amount paid a given owner for the return benefits received from the project that
are shared with the public at large. The point here is to preserve parity, which in turn reduces
the level of political machinations. On these risks, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH
THE STATE 98-103 (1993) on the preservation of the surplus. Note that Justice Brewer is also
correct when he observes that some setoffs may well be appropriate for any increased value
that goes uniquely to the party whose property is taken. That proposition in turn raises the
question of additional recovery for severance damages, an issue to which he alludes, but does
not resolve. See Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 326 ("We do not in this refer to the case where only
a portion of a tract is taken, or express any opinion on the vexed question as to the extent to
which the benefits or injuries to the portion not taken may be brought into consideration.").
31. For a tantalizingly cryptic discussion of the issue, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 97-98 (1980).

32. Id.
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fluctuations in its competence level. So the dominant inquiry remains how well the Supreme Court can expect the legislature to
reform across different areas.
Historically, that legislative failure was immense on questions
of race in the period, between, say, 1890 and 1960,33 where disenfranchisement and marginalization of minority groups rested on a
fashionable form of racial bigotry that all too often permeated legislative and administrative action. Similarly, political dissent calls
for a high level of judicial scrutiny, given the inveterate danger that
incumbents will stack the deck in their favor. Moving on, there are
also high levels of scrutiny in dealing with state restrictions on the
flow of interstate commerce, precisely because of the well-known
tendency of states to favor their voters at the expense of out-of-state
parties who need not only the protection of diversity jurisdiction, but
also protection of a nondiscrimination provision so that they are not
treated more harshly than their local competitors. 3 4
In dealing with these areas, one theme dominates the interpretation of the case law: every juncture follows in rough contour the
principles not of the strong libertarian, but of the classical liberal.
It is important to state briefly both the similarities and differences
between these two positions. 35 Both libertarian and classical liberal theories start with the view that individual autonomy, or selfownership, is the indisputable starting place for the analysis of any
system of individual rights. This includes those enshrined in the
Constitution, with its explicit guarantees, good against both the
state and the federal government, that no person should be deprived
of life, liberty of property, without due process of law. 36 Clearly, these
items are placed on the list because they are the dominant interests
that are worth protecting; a proposition that follows easily from the
general Lockean proposition that speaks about the protection of
"lives, liberties, and estates" 37 which compromise the only interests
that are protected under the name "property," which clearly let the
33. For a discussion, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d
ed. 1974).
34. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
35. I develop this theme in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD
(1995).
36. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
37. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 222 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
1997) (1690).
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state afford police power protections against theft, rape and murder
in order to protect the autonomy of the person.
For the purposes of this paper, however, the key element is the
protection of property, which covers land and much else besides, including water rights, air rights, chattels, and intellectual property.
To some libertarians, these rights are conceived of as "absolute" so
that they can be forfeited or otherwise lost only for two reasons: first,
to satisfy the losses attributable to aggression against others, and second, to honor a prior contractual obligation made to others but not
discharged. In contrast, taxation in any form and eminent domain
find no secure place under an uncompromising libertarian approach
because both involve the state initiation of forced exchanges where
the state determines both whether the exchange shall take place
and the amount of compensation supplied for that property loss.38
The classical liberal position understands both the necessity for,
and the dangers of, the twin practices of taxation and eminent domain. As to need, without the insertion of state power, there is simply no way overcome the massive holdout and coordination problems
that stand in the path of organizing key social institutions. In this
context, I shall not rehearse the well-understood reasons for requiring the collective provision of public goods.39 But it is important to
note that authorization of both the taxing and eminent domain powers is explicit in the Constitution.4 0 Accordingly, no credible case can
be made for reading the document as a hard-line libertarian tract.
But by the same token, the careful calibration of the rules that
govern both taxation and condemnation make it equally clear that
the Framers of the Constitution were painfully aware of the abuses
that often cropped up in the operation of these powers. Thus, where
the commitment to the right is firm, as with speech and free trade,
the explicit limitations against exploitation are found in a narrow
definition of the police power, such that the use of government force
without the payment of compensation is concentrated on activities
that involve the use or threat of force or fraud.4 1 The state can
38. For a powerful statement of this point of view, see ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN (1987).

39. For the classic exposition, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

(1965).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, § 8, cl. 1, § 9, cls. 1, 4, 5.
41. For a systematic discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 107-46 (1985).
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impose restrictions against firms that threaten the use of force
against potential customers that choose to do business with their
rivals. But it cannot introduce protectionist legislation that prohibits fair competition-no force and fraud-in the marketplace
for goods any more than it can do so in the marketplace for ideas,
which was the point of the so-called labor exception to the police
power in Lochner v. New York. 42 It is, in a word, no accident that the
concern for misleading statements marks the limits of state control
in dealing with advertisement and other forms of commercial speech.4 3
It is equally the case that the ability to prevent the shipment of goods
into another state depends on a clear showing that they pose a peril
to the animal and plant life located there.4 4 When there are no such
justifications, the restrictions on outsiders must be matched by similar restrictions on insiders, so that regulation does not create a home
court advantage to domestic firms. 4 5
All those protections remain in place under any regime of strict
scrutiny because the Justices have understood the social gains that
come from protection of the underlying interests. But it is just that
conviction that fails when the discussion switches to the protection
of property rights under the Takings Clause. In modern times, property is no longer regarded as the guardian of every other right. It is
often treated as though it were the bastion of privilege or that it
protects holdings that have some vague, dubious pedigree. Or that
there are a dizzying array of supposed externalities-visual and aesthetic ones easily come to mind 4 6-that justify its regulation without
compensation. If that capacious definition of the police power were
applied to speech, it would allow anyone to plead their own adverse
reaction to deny the rights of others to burn the American flag, 4 7
or, to push the claim even further, to resist saying the Pledge of
Allegiance. 48 The point here is that there is no alternative to the
classical liberal theory on the limited scope of the police power, if
the central task of constitutionalism is to design a government that
42. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For discussion of its collusive effects,
see DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011).

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
See Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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is strong enough to protect its catalog of individual rights without
letting an abuse of government power snuff out those same rights.
The adoption of the rational basis test therefore represents a key
surrender on this central point, by adopting a course of action that
literally offers the state vastly more running room than the classical
liberal position-by a factor of one hundred, as it were. It is this willingness to let down the guard that marks in so many ways Justice
O'Connor's jurisprudence in this area. It is instructive to go through
her major opinions on this area with this point in mind. In so doing
it is instructive to see how they build on all the earlier decisions
that were set out above. In Part II look at the dramatic turn around
in her two public use decisions, Midkiff and Kelo. In Part II, I extend
the analysis to her two decisions that deal with the issue of regulatory
takings, Yee v. Village of/Escondido4 9 and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc."o Part III looks at her opinions in Connolly and Eastern Enterprise in the context of retroactive legislation. The last Part concludes.
I. PUBLIC USE AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE: OF MIDKIFFAND KELO

Hawaiian Housing Authority v. Midki//"
marked Justice
O'Connor's first major opinion on property law. Writing for a unanimous 8-0 majority, she upheld the constitutionality of Hawaii's
Land Reform Act of 1967,52 which created a scheme for the transfer
of a landlord's interest in leased premises to the sitting tenant by
use of the state's eminent domain power. The first salient feature of
this scheme is that the condemnation was not initiated by the state
for some public purpose. Instead, under the Act's provision, any
group of sitting tenants could petition the local government for the
condemnation. Once the petition is made, the matter was referred
to the Hawaiian Housing Authority for a determination of whether
49. Yee v. Village of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1993). I have previously made my views
clear on the case, in Richard A. Epstein, Yee v. City of Escondido: The Supreme Court Strikes
Out Again, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 3 (1992).
50. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
51. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); see Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986) (arguing that Midkiff illustrates that
"courts have no theory or conceptual foundation from which meaningful standards for judicial review of public use issues might originate."); see also H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for
Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987) (arguing that Midkiff was decided in accordance with
originalist principles because of "the difficulty of tying the hostility to redistribution directly
to the 'public use' language of the fifth amendment.").
52. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 516-1 et seq. (2011).
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the condemnation is consistent with the provision of the Act. Thereafter, the state was authorized to lend money to individual tenants
to help them finance the condemnation in question but could only
proceed with the particular condemnation once the financing was
arranged so that the state took no independent financial risk. In
dealing with this case, the Ninth Circuit held that this elaborate
scheme ran afoul of the Constitution because at root, it was nothing
more than "a naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to
take the private property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's
private use and benefit."53
When the case reached the Supreme Court therefore, the public
use question was regarded as a live one by the lower courts. Affirming
that decision on the ground stated by the Ninth Circuit would have
done no obvious violence to the constitutional text or, as I shall show,
to the prior decisions of the Supreme Court. But Justice O'Connor
did not take that course. Instead she took her cue from the one earlier decision, Berman v. Parker,5 4 which in good incremental fashion
she treated as the "starting point of our analysis."" That 1954 decision reflected a strong academic consensus that the demands for
intelligent urban planning required a virtual nullification of the public use requirement, such that the protection afforded individual property owners was solely through the payment of just compensation. 5 6
Those two factors put her immediately in her comfort zone. Her challenge was how to reach that result, where the outcome depended on
the choice of the constitutional standard of review. On that question,
she opted emphatically for the rational basis test by uttering one
sentence, with one key word, that largely charted the course of government takings (as opposed to regulations) in the United States for
the next 20 years or more. The key word is, of course, "conceivable."
The larger passage in which it is embedded reads as follows:
To be sure, the Court's cases have repeatedly stated that "one
person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another
53. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 235 (quoting Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F. 2d 788, 798 (1983)).
54. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
55. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 239.
56. For discussion, see Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, An Advance
Requiem, 58 YALE L. J. 599, 613-14 (1949). For my views, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 161-62 (1985). For a somewhat
different account of public use, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
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private person without a justifying public purpose, even though
compensation be paid." Thus, in Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska, where the "order in question was not, and was not claimed
to be, ... a taking of private property for a public use under the

right of eminent domain," the Court invalidated a compensated
taking of property for lack of a justifying public purpose. But
where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held
a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.
On this basis, we have no trouble concluding that the Hawaii
Act is constitutional.5 7
The passage is highly suspect on a large number of grounds. The
first of these is textual. The Constitution does not say "nor shall
private property be taken for uses that the legislature find serve a
conceivable public purpose without just compensation." The words
"public use" are narrower than the words "public purpose," for there
are many government takings that might serve a public purpose
where the public makes no use of the land. Indeed, Midkiff is just
one of those cases, for once the process runs its course the tenantturned-fee owner has the outright fee interest indistinguishable
from that of any other property owner. The elastic nature of the
clause is made more palpable by the insertion of the word "conceivable" in the passage, even though that term does not appear in any
of the cases that she cites in support of her new general proposition.
And with the insertion of that word, it looks as though the public
use clause does receive its final burial. It is without question the
case that virtually any comprehensive government program serves
multiple ends, some of which count as good public policy and others
of which count as bad ends. Adding the word "conceivable" makes it
highly likely that one of those other purposes, taken alone and out
of context, becomes sufficient to support the result. What started out
as a limitation on the power of government to take property has now
been eviscerated to allow the scheme in question.
So the issue then turns to the question of whether any such conceivable purpose can be identified. On this score, Justice O'Connor
does not break stride. Spurred on by an ingenious argument by two
constitutional heavyweights, Laurence Tribe and Kathleen Sullivan,
Justice O'Connor concluded that the high concentration of land
57. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (internal citations removed).
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ownership in Hawaii creates a "land oligopoly," which the Hawaii
legislature could, and did, create as an evil by imposing artificial
increases in rents." Arguments of this sort pass muster only because they are not meant to be subject to scrutiny, let alone refutation. The observation that land is concentrated in the hands of 72 or
22 landowners is consistent with intense competition in the rental
market, for these concentrations are far below the three or four firms
that attract attention under the antitrust law.59
At no point does she ask, however, a theoretical question of whether state intervention is needed to cure any market failure. On this
point, moreover, theory lines up squarely against her. The key insight in this area is that the eminent domain power is primarily
needed to secure the assembly of many different parcels of land that
are needed to achieve a single integrated purpose, such as a railroad
that has to cut through the land of many owners. In a world without
eminent domain, there is a material risk that individual landowners
could hold out for large sums of money, such that the combined demands could easily upend a project that it is in the interest of all to
go forward. The just compensation requirement insures that no individual is necessarily made worse off by the state action, at least
if the compensation is correctly calculated, which often today it is
not.60 The decision to go forward in the face of that cost thus allows
the state to achieve through coercion a positive collective that no set
of private contracts could hope to match.
In contrast, the situation presented in Midkiff is the antithesis of
the standard setting for invoking the eminent domain power. All
that is at stake in Midkiff is a large collection of individual bilateral
contracts, each of which could be renegotiated independent of the
others. Here is a case where private buyouts are simpler, cheaper,
58. See Midkiff, 46 U.S. at 241-42; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 516 (2011).
59. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, § 5.3 (2010). "The
HHI [the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index] is calculated by summing the squares of the
individual firms' market shares, and thus gives proportionately greater weight to the larger
market shares." An HHI below 1500 normally attracts no attention. The HHI for a market
with 22 equal size firms is effectively zero. Any market in which the largest firm has only 10
percent of the market will usually have a HHI of under 200. Note that at best the HHI is only
a minimum condition for intervention. In some cases a merger between a strong and a weak
firm could be justified even if it increases concentration, by adding to the efficiency of the
combined firm.
60. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 115 (1985).
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and more accurate than the clumsy state administrative apparatus.
The individual difficulties in lease renegotiation cannot count as a
reason to justify forced condemnation under the aegis of the state,
for if they do so, then any lease, or indeed any other contract, could
be overridden on the ground that contract modification is a complex
process, which indeed it is. The simple truth is that the case for eminent domain could not be at a lower ebb than it is in this setting,
especially since the Bishop Estate (which was the state's largest
landlord) was seeking at the time to work out deals with tenants, in
the face of an all-too-evident sovereign risk, which is best combated
by diversifying assets across several different jurisdictions.
This theoretical explanation points as well to a strong cleavage
between Midkif and Berman v. Parker on which Justice O'Connor
heavily relied.61 Berman was a land use case in which the question
was whether to condemn a perfectly viable department store in a
blighted neighborhood. On this score, Justice Douglas pointed to the
kinds of physical, aesthetic and monetary judgments that had to be
made, and claimed that none of these should be second-guessed by
the courts.6 2 That proposition is doubtful in Berman,6 3 but even if his
point were 100 percent correct, none of those considerations were
raised in Midkif, where no change in land use of any type was
contemplated. Midkif presents no issue of potential nuisances, no
issue of aesthetic compatibility. Berman and Midkif could have
61. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
62. We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced
as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety
of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District
of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 33. Note that this particular passage was not quoted in Midkiff.
63. For my critique, see Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a Post-Kelo World, 17 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 151 (2009); see also Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political
Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (arguing that Kelo has resulted in "a more
extensive legislative reaction than any other single court decision in American history"). But
see Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 90-99 (2005) (arguing
that neither the majority nor dissent in Kelo represent pragmatic decision-making, because
they do not consider the reason for eminent domain and New London's reasons for invoking
eminent domain, and its consequences).
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been distinguished on perfectly sensible grounds if Justice O'Connor
had only been prepared to look closely at the different factual patterns in the two cases.
Once again, the rational basis test is an open invitation for sloppy
analysis, where the acontextual use of language trumps any critical examination of the underlying differences, even though Justice
O'Connor well knew that the earlier cases did not line up well with
Berman. Why else would she begin the quoted passage with an apologetic, "[t]o be sure"? Indeed, any close examination of the other
cases that she cites reveals that none of them are remotely similar

to the outright private transfer in Midkiff. To give but one example,
in Rindge v. County of Los Angeles,6 4 the landowner alleged that the
state had made a sham taking of his ranchland for use as a public
highway near Malibu, California. The challenge admitted that the
road would be open to the public, but insisted that that public roadway would not be connected to other public roads. What this has to do
with the situation in Midkiff is anyone's guess. But the bottom line
is that the desire not to rock a political consensus dominated over
all three defensible grounds on which the case could be examined:
text, theory, and precedent.
The many mistakes and confusions in Midkiff proved a perfect foil
for the second of Justice O'Connor's public use opinions, her notable
Kelo dissent.6 5 That opinion gave her some measure of redemption
by casting the rational basis test to the winds. Her most famous line
will have enduring appeal to both populists and defenders of property
alike. "Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6
with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with
a factory." 66 The clear implication is that all sorts of high-handed

activities are possible without some explicit invocation of the eminent domain power. At this point, she pounces on the risk of government abuse that eluded her in Midkiff. Rindge, for example, re-enters
the picture, only now it stands not for the ability of government to
spread its tentacles broadly, but as a representative of "straightforward and constitutional" cases in which "the sovereign may transfer
private property to public ownership-such as for a road, hospital
or military base." 67 Berman also receives a rather different reading
64.
65.
66.
67.

Rindge v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494-505.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 497.
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than it did in Midkiff, for now she has no patience with the general
proposition that the state enjoys carte blanche in dealing with land
development decisions. Thus in Kelo she describes in painful detail
the lack of adequate street and alleys, light and air, that prompted
the DC land use decision.6 8 At this point, she can show the powerful
difference between Berman and the plight of Wilhelmina Dery, who
is dragged from the "well-maintained house" where she had lived
with her husband since 1946. The term "conceivable" also gets a
complete makeover, which leaves rational basis in tatters. "Yet for
all the emphasis on deference, Berman and Midkiff hewed to a bedrock principle without which our public use jurisprudence would
collapse." 69 To drive that point home, she opens her opinion by quoting the well-rehearsed language in Calder v. Bull with its natural
law overtones:
An Act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to
the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority .

. .

. A few in-

stances will suffice to explain what I mean.... [A] law that takes
property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and
justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such powers;
and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.70
It was of course just this trope that motivated the Ninth Circuit in
Midkiff v. Tom, which Justice O'Connor peremptorily tossed aside
in Midkiff." The wholesale (and welcome) retreat from her earlier
decision becomes clear when she notes that the seeds of the Kelo
debacle are found in the "errant language"72 found in Berman and
Midkiff. Midkiff s devastating word "conceivable" does not appear in
her Kelo dissent, but it does appear in Justice Thomas's dissent,
when he states that the Takings Clause authorizes "the taking of
property only if the public has a right to employ it, not if the public
realizes any conceivable benefit from the taking."73 Note the great
leap backwards from rational basis to near-strict scrutiny in a single
68. Id. at 498.
69. Id. at 500.
70. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798)) (emphasis deleted
in Kelo).
71. See discussion, supra.
72. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501.
73. Id. at 510.
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sentence! Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor remains at a loss to distinguish Kelo from Midkif, so she invokes a tired terminological ploy
in speaking about Berman and Midkif : "Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the property
was turned over to private use."74 The difficulty is that the statement is false. All the benefits from Berman were indirect because
the department store had to be sacrificed for collateral goals. All the
long-term alleged benefits in Midkif came from how fee ownership
could promote economic development. If those cases are direct benefits, then so too the result in Kelo, whether those benefits pan out
or not.
The real sociological challenge does not lie in spinning fine tales
to distinguish Kelo from its predecessors. Rather, the challenge is to
find out why Kelo provoked a political uproar of the first magnitude,
while Midkif passed by under the radar to large public silence. The
explanation cannot lie on the nature of the public use that was
advanced. Kelo, like Berman, was a land use case, while Midkif was
a title-shifting affair, which is surely the weaker ground. Rather, the
big difference comes from the other side of the market, which in no
way enters into the formal eminent domain equation on public use.
Midkif did not involve a change of possession of the subject once the
scheme was put into effect. Instead, it let sitting tenants take out landlords whose only interest in the property was in future cash flows.
Subjective value was of no concern in Midkif because the properties
were always for sale at a price. But with Kelo, there was a forcible
dispossession of people who had lived their entire lives on the premises, with no desire to sell and no desire to hold out for a higher
price. They just wanted to be left alone. Yet they were swept aside
in an inexhaustible search for tax revenue, which is what prompted
Justice O'Connor's telling Motel 6 to Ritz-Carlton example. Mind you,
this should be a powerful theme even if the houses were taken for
a road. But at that point, there is no obvious textual hook to block
the transaction by invoking the "for public use," because in admitted
public use cases, the political processes alone decide whether to go
ahead, once the just compensation requirement is satisfied.
None of that mattered in this case, where the toxic combination
of unprincipled constitutional interpretation and illicit public purpose gave rise to the backlash of the new millennium against Kelo.
74. Id. at 500 (italics in original).
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Justice O'Connor deserves abundant credit for raising the issue in
Kelo. But Justice Stevens's thoughtless majority decision came out
in the wrong way, in part because Justice O'Connor never offered in
Midkiff the interpretation of Berman that she hit on in Kelo. Take
on that task early on, and it becomes possible to outline the major
factual differences between a plausible land use plan in Berman
and New London's want of any coherent plan-where the city had
all the vacant land it needed for structures it never would build on
anyhow. Justice O'Connor's personal redemption for her errors in
Midkiff brings too little and comes too late. Indeed it is clear that
the use of that dangerous term "conceivable" has guided the Court's
deliberation in areas outside the narrow public use connection, leading it to uphold dubious real estate taxation schemes in a number
of other contexts.75
II. PHYSICAL AND REGULATORY TAKINGS: OF YEE AND LINGLE

Justice O'Connor's next two major takings decisions deal not with
public use, but with the distinction between regulatory and physical takings. The problem here is a genuine one because the Takings
Clause has its clearest application in those cases where the government swoops down in tyrannical fashion to seize private property for
itself. Everyone recognizes that this outright expropriation is caught
by the Takings Clause. But the issues become far more complex when
the government acts more gingerly in approaching property which
is subject to divided ownership, often by the creation of a landlord/
tenant relationship. These common arrangements obviously produce
gains from trade for the two parties, and a sound law of takings would
do little to jeopardize these arrangements by stripping away some
75. The latest manifestation of this regrettable world view is found in Justice Breyer's
opinion in Armour v. City of Indianapolis,Indiana, in which Breyer thought that the applicable standard was that "the 'burden is on the one attacking the [classification] to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it."' 132 S. Ct. 2073 (2012). In that case,
Indianapolis gave its residents two ways to pay for special assessments, one by a lump sum
and the other by periodic payments. When it changed the assessment system, it was prepared
to waive future payments from those who had only paid the initial installments, but not to
refund the unused portion of the prepaid expenses. The administrative burdens here are
trivial, and the distinction made thus penalizes one group that took one of two equivalent
economic offers. For critique, see Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Laziness on the Supreme
Court: It's Time to Scrap the Irrational "Rational Basis Test," DEFINING IDEAS: A HOOVER
INSTITUTION JOURNAL, http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/119811.
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of the protection given to owners when they divide their property
interest. Nonetheless, in many of these cases, the level of protection
to partial interests in real property is given far less protection than
is afforded to the unified fee simple interest.
Two of Justice O'Connor's opinions, Yee v. City of/Escondido7 6 and
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.," raise variations on this theme, in connection with one of the central distinctions in the law of takings: what,
if any, is the line between physical and regulatory takings. Today's
by-the-book Supreme Court doctrine rests on a bedrock distinction
between what are termed "physical" takings and "regulatory" takings.
The first and more important of these decisions is Yee. At stake was
a mobile home ordinance that the City passed pursuant to a California
authorization statute that allowed tenants who occupied mobile homes
to remain on the property of their landlords after the expiration of
their leases, at rents determined by the local government to be "just,
fair and reasonable," in light of a variety of factors. All of the factors
related to the cost of providing the space and none of them related
to the increase in value attributable to a shift in market demand.7 8
Justice O'Connor approached this case within the general framework. She understood full well that if this scheme were struck down,
the traditional systems of rent control for ordinary apartments would
come under increased scrutiny. Her decision dutifully applied a near
syllogism. There is a strong distinction between physical and regulatory takings, which is binding on the Court, and which subjected the
76. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1993); see also Epstein, supra note 49, at 3.
77. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); see also James W. Ely Jr., "Poor
Relation" Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing Rights of Property Owners,
2004-2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39 (arguing that Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lingle "makes
some valid points" and yet must be a "setback for those interested in reviving constitutional
protection for the rights of property owners"); Dale A. Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle:
Implications for Takings Doctrine, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 573 (2007) (arguing that the
implication of Justice O'Connor's Lingle opinion is that "governmental purposes and objectives
remain highly relevant in assessing whether a taking is justified by the 'background principles' concept of Lucas . .").

78. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 524-25. The ordinance allows the rentals to be set:
after considering the following nonexclusive list of factors: (1) changes in the
Consumer Price Index; (2) the rent charged for comparable mobile home pads in
Escondido; (3) the length of time since the last rent increase; (4) the cost of any
capital improvements related to the pad or pads at issue; (5) changes in property
taxes; (6) changes in any rent paid by the park owner for the land; (7) changes in
utility charges; (8) changes in operating and maintenance expenses; (9) the need
for repairs other than for ordinary wear and tear; (10) the amount and quality
of services provided to the affected tenant; and (11) any lawful existing lease.

2012]

THE PROPERTY RIGHTS DECISIONS

199

government to only minimal scrutiny. This ordinance constituted a
regulatory not a physical taking so that the public utility model on
rate of return worked. The opinion is just flatly wrong on both
points. I shall take them up separately.
A. Physical Versus Regulatory Takings
The genesis of this distinction lies in two key Supreme Court cases,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp." and Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. City of/New York." Loretto establishes a nearper se compensation rule in physical takings cases, and Penn Central
authorizes a rational basis-like standard (though the phrase "rational
basis" is never used) in regulatory takings. In Loretto, the Court required compensation (which turned out to be very little indeed)"
when the government occupied private property or when it authorized private parties to do so pursuant to its own legislative powers.
In Loretto, the application of that rule required compensation when
a private cable operator was allowed to install a cable box on the roof
of the landowner's apartment building. On the other side of the line
fall those cases in which the government does not either enter or
authorize entry but instead imposes regulations that restrict the
uses that a landowner can make of his or her property. The paradigmatic case on that issue in our law is Penn Central,which famously
held that in regulatory takings cases, the per se rule gave away to
"ad hoc" standards, such that the landowner could not recover the
diminution in land values without a clear showing that the government actions had exceeded their proper scope. 82 The case relies famously on a balancing test of the sort that Justice O'Connor gravitates
toward, and which she relied on in Yee. 83 The ultimate question is
whether this hundred-or-so-fold difference in levels of scrutiny is
justified in Yee.
Justice O'Connor wrote again for a unanimous Court, which was
subject to only two short concurrences by Justices Blackmun and
Souter on points of no matter. As with Midkiff, Justice O'Connor
79. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
80. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
81. See Loretto v. Group W. Cable, 522 N.Y.S.2d 543 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (affirming a
denial of attorney's fees, effectively upholding Loretto's final amount of $1 in damages).
82. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104.
83. Yee, 503 U.S. at 523 & 531.
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was at her worst in dealing with this challenge, because she was
always within her comfort zone, and never felt obliged to grapple
with any of the tough conceptual issues that are raised by the
physical/regulatory taking distinction that has gained such a stranglehold over the judicial imagination. There are, of course, important differences between takings by way of occupation that are
concentrated on one person and general regulations that bind large
groups. But these are polar opposites that have to be explained as
part of a general theory that also encompasses the many intermediate cases. On the one side, regulation can start to focus down until
the restrictions bind only one or very few properties. On the other, an
aggressive government program could result in the condemnation
of small holdings from a large number of people. An ideal theory
does not just deal with the polar opposites, but also has to deal with
the many intermediate cases. In these cases, the hard-edged line has
to be justified as a matter of first principle, and workable in fact.
The decisions in both Penn Central and Loretto fail to offer the
requisite conceptual foundation for this ostensible hard-edged distinction. At issue in Penn Central was whether a landmark designation for Grand Central Station allowed the City of New York to block
construction of a new office tower over the old station without compensation. 4 The first challenge asks why this should be treated as
though it is a mere regulatory taking, when in fact the decision meant
that the landowner was prevented from using his air rights which
were a fully protected interest under state law, capable of being sold,
mortgaged, leased and the like. For this inquiry, Justice Brennan
did not even seek to offer an answer, but only insisted that the proper approach required "this Court [to focus] rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole-here, the city tax block designated as the 'landmark site.""' That approach marks an enormous
departure from the law of private property more generally, whose
signal achievement has been to develop a regime that allows for the
creation, transfer and protection of divided interests in property in
order to permit maximum gain from the use of a particular resource.
The process takes place in two steps. First, the transfer allocates the
rights between the two parties, where we are confident of a joint
84. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 115-19.
85. Id. at 130-31.
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gain that exceeds the transaction costs of putting the deal together,
for otherwise that deal would never have occurred in the first place.
The second is that the transaction between the two parties does not
increase their rights over that which the original landowner had
before the division. The creation of air rights squarely meets both
those tests, so the challenge is why the takings law does not follow
suit and apply to both interests in that private property at the same
time. That result would increase private wealth without blocking
the ability of state to acquire the air rights if it decided that the public
gain from open space exceeded the private gain from development.
The case thus falls exactly under a sensible account of public use so
sorely missing in Berman and Midkiff.
The avenue for that development was presented by the 1960 decision of the Court in Armstrong v. United States with its oft and
justly quoted passage that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... [is]
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole."8 6 In Penn Central, Justice Brennan pays lip
service to the passage, but then engages in the kind of dangerous
deconstruction of rules that dismisses the categorical command of
Armstrong with the general observation that "this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons."87 Justice
Brennan couldn't because he didn't try. Instead, he retreated to "ad
hoc inquiries" tests, where the key trade-off asks whether the:
... economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, par-

ticularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government,

. .

. than when interference arises from some

public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good."
86. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
87. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
88. Id. (internal citations removed).
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But this passage does not contain a whiff of an explanation why the
loss of air rights does not count as a physical taking or why the
designation of a few buildings for special treatment counts as an
adjustment of benefits and burdens instead of a disproportionate
exaction on one side. The mystery, moreover, only deepens with
Loretto, where Justice Marshall affirms the weak holding of Penn
Central, but then concludes, along with Professor Frank Michelman
(also in attendance at our Conference), that the invariable rule for
physical takings, or more precisely, those that involve a "permanent
occupation," is one that necessarily calls for just compensation. But
a reader can look in vain throughout Loretto to find anything more
than a recitation of cases that applied this distinction for an explanation of how it fits into a comprehensive theory. At no point does
Loretto give a theoretical reason why a clause that on its face appears to apply to all forms of private property, including air rights,
should lead to such disjoint outcomes. At no point does it explain
why the political risks of faction are greater with occupations than
with regulations, given that political groups are all too eager to
impose regulations that give them enormous benefits while creating
social losses at the same time.
One reason why the physical/regulatory takings line is so vexed
is that it grew up long after the first rent control cases, which justified these statutes as a wartime effort to combat monopoly rents in
cases where there was a rapid increase in the demand for land."
That regulation allowed tenants to stay on after the expiration of
their leases, but did not authorize them to stay on in perpetuity. But
as these statutes were renewed on a regular basis, their rationale
had to change, such that they became a form of tenant protection
against ostensible exploitation in real estate markets that are in
most locations intensely competitive. Once the physical/regulatory
distinction gained traction, it was no simple matter to fit the earlier
rental cases in it, given that the holdover tenant remained in possession after the expiration of the lease. The common law view on
this question was that the holdover tenant remained in possession
only at the sufferance of the landlord." The landlord was entitled
to immediate eviction, or could hold the tenant to the fair market
value of the leased premises if that figure were greater than the
89. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
90. For discussion, see, for example, Crechale & Polles, Inc. v. Smith, 295 So.2d 275 (1974).
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stipulated rent in the lease, which was often in the case. In some
jurisdictions, the holdover tenant was liable for double rent." The
simple logic here was that the tenant was in the wrong, so that all
doubtful questions had to be resolved in favor of the landlord, which
is the best way to avoid difficulties when the tenant overstays his or
her welcome. The common law cases do not contain the slightest hint
that the holdover tenant could remain in possession at his own option for a rent set by the state.
It follows, therefore, that Loretto's per se rule of just compensation
should apply to all holdover tenants. Since the rent control statutes
provided for a rent that was kept systematically below the appropriate levels, the statutes were necessarily confiscatory unless the state
picked up the difference between statutory rent and market value.
Indeed, in strict logic, the just compensation issue needed not be addressed at all if Midkiffcomes out the other way. The only difference
between the two cases is that under the Hawaiian statute at issue
in Midkiff, the reversionary interest was transferred to the tenant
in one closed transaction, while in the rent control cases, the transfer takes place month by month, without a definite end. But the differences between a perpetual lease and outright transfer of property
have no bearing on either the just compensation or the public use
question. In both cases, the statute should fail. Any return to first
principles of takings law, therefore, condemns all rent control statutes on Loretto's per se basis.
That condemnation is correct not only as a formal doctrinal matter. It also is critical from a social point of view, where the holdover
tenants at low rents lead to systematic and pervasive resource misallocations. Tenants that should leave rent control premises stay on
for long periods of time, such that outsiders who could make better
use of the property are shut out by the system. The landlord, who is
constantly short-changed on revenues, now has little incentive to improve the property. Social resources are wasted in the endless ratemaking proceedings that take place at city hall. Communities are
hurt by the mismatch of the tenants to the neighbor, as graying communities have little use for the ball fields and other facilities that
are far more suitable to younger tenants. Nonetheless, the ability of
entrenched tenants to vote their preferences shows a difficult public
91. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.06 (2011) (providing double rent to the landlord when
the tenant refuses "to give up possession of the premises at the end of the tenant's lease").

204

PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:177

choice problem that makes it all too difficult to undo the damage
by legislation.
B. The Escondido Ordinance
The state of the general law at the time of Yee was so fixed that
only a Supreme Court decision that undid cases like Block v. Hirsh
could change the landscape. Indeed, a challenge to San Jose's rent
control statute had just gone down in flames in Pennell v. City of/San
Jose,92 notwithstanding the strong opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia
(both concurring and dissenting, joined only by Justice O'Connor),
which noted that the government could avoid expropriation of landlords by renting the property at market rates and reletting it at subsidized rates, making up the difference out of general revenues.9 3
Faced with strong Supreme Court precedent, determined lower
court judges sought to escape the clutches of the rent control law by
engaging in what could only be described as an ingenious, but dubious, end run. In the typical rent control case, the tenant remained
in possession of the premises after the expiration of the lease. With
the typical mobile home, the vehicle remained on someone else's land
after the expiration of the lease. In Hall v. City of Santa Barbara,9 4
Judge Alex Kozinski seized on that difference to move the Santa
Barbara ordinance to the physical takings side of the line. That result was supported by William Fischel,9" who claimed that the differences in local politics were such that the concentrated force of
these mobile home tenants could dictate outcomes in small communities, but that rent control in larger cities required a solid measure
of larger community support. 96 But the political economy point should
run in the opposite direction. As Madison's definition of faction in
Federalist Number 10 makes clear, any constitutional order has to
attend to two different risks: majority expropriation of the minority,
and minority expropriation of the majority. The question of which
92. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1985).
93. Id. at21-22.
94. Hallv. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1279 n.24 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 940 (1988).
95. William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient Regulation
a Taking of Property?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865 (1992), critiqued in Epstein, supra note 49,
at 11-15.
96. See Fischel, supra note 95, at 894-98.
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risk is greater cannot be answered in the abstract. Much depends
on the salience of the issue in general politics. But there is with the
Takings Clause no reason to predict the outcome in advance, for once
the politicians have done their work it should be clear in which direction the expropriation goes. That level of wealth transfer is apparent
in both settings, so in both the proper result is to invalidate the taking for the want of any serious effort to protect landlord interests.
The novelty of the situation, however, presents a problem for
Justice O'Connor because here the intrusion into space took a form
that made the physical invasion inescapable. But rather than dealing with the issue head on, she resorted to a set of dubious judicial
techniques to avoid a serious analysis of the question. Her first ploy
was to insist that this was not really a physical takings case at all:
what was at stake in her view ". . . is a regulation of petitioners' use

of their property, and thus does not amount to a per se taking."9 7
The italicization of the term "use" does not do anything to save the
argument. There is no case in which someone enters land without
an intention to make use of it. To say that all entries are use cases
leaves the class of physical takings empty. The key issue here is that
the original entry under the lease was permissible only until the expiration of the lease, so that the rules on physical takings have to be
adjusted to deal with future interests,9 8 which is what the law of
holdover tenants tries to do. Her astonishing proposition means that
it is now respectable to claim that a party who is admitted to land
for a year is entitled to stay forever because there is no need for a
fresh entry after the expiration of a term. That doctrine would be
the end of real estate law as we know it, because it would put in
jeopardy all standard commercial leases. But in this instance, the
point of this facile argument was to insist that the taking therefore
had to be treated under the more lenient balancing test of Penn
Central, which she then declined to do because that count had not
been raised below. 9 9 Yet, true to form, when Judge Bybee tried to
revive that regulatory takings argument in Guggenheim v. Goleta,100
he was reversed en banc a year later.10 1 Yee had sealed its doom.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Yee, 503 U.S. at 532 (italics in the original).
See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
See Yee, 503 U.S. at 522-23.
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2009).
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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The second part of Justice O'Connor's argument was no more persuasive than the first. She argued that there was really no taking in
this situation because the landlord is entitled to regain possession of
the land so long as he was prepared to turn it to some alternative use.
She writes:
At least on the face of the regulatory scheme, neither the City
nor the State compels petitioners, once they have rented their
property to tenants, to continue doing so. To the contrary, the
Mobilehome Residency Law provides that a park owner who
wishes to change the use of his land may evict his tenants, albeit
with six or twelve months notice. Put bluntly, no government
has required any physical invasion of petitioner's property. 10 2
Put bluntly, this passage offers a classic illustration of how a local
government, with Supreme Court blessing, can protect its ordinance
by leaving the landowner with one useless stick in the bundle of
rights. The point here is made clear by running any valuation of the
landlord's interest before and after the passage of the local ordinance. Before, the value of the land for its use as a rental site remains intact after the expiration of the lease. During the period of
that lease, the landlord's interest is equal to the sum of the discounted lease payments coupled with the discounted present value
of the reversionary interest when it falls into possession. For shortterm leases that are close to market value, the second term dominates the first. Under the new arrangement, the landlord receives a
sum equal to the present discounted value of future payments under
the government lease, which are far less than those payments when
the property could be leased out again at market value.
To that, Justice O'Connor adds the value of the right to turn the
property to other use. But that right is close to worthless for two
reasons. First, in most cases the highest and best use of property lies
in its current use patterns. Thus the right to regain the premises
only applies to what is at best a small set of cases where major
changes in land use are contemplated. Second, that supposed right
is hemmed in by other land use regulations in the City of Goleta, for
any change in land use patterns requires the landowner to go through
102. Yee, 503 U.S. at 527-28 (internal citations removed).
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extensive administrative hearings that, given the local opposition,
are likely to block any projects for life, as it were. In these cases, the
correct measure is whether the compensation in question is a full
and perfect equivalent of the rights surrendered. Zero does not meet
that standard.
There is a close connection between the Justice O'Connor of
Midkiff and the Justice O'Connor of Yee. Both of these cases deal
with the transfer of the landlord's reversion to the tenant in possession at below market prices. In both these cases, there is no need at
all for government intervention because there is no holdout problem
to be dealt with, which could not be countered by a term in the lease
that provides, for example, that if the tenant vacates the premises
and leaves the mobile home in place, the landlord must pay him the
fair market value for the (depreciated) property in question. There
is, moreover, no serious monopoly problem in either place, at least if
there were more than one mobile home site in the immediate environment, even though that point was raised at the time by Joseph
Sax.1 03 And even if there were, the remedy is to make sure that the
rents in question are adjusted to competitive levels, which would
reflect the increase in the underlying value of the real estate. Those
rents would surely be recoverable if the landowner sold the property
to a new person for its fair market value, and they should be captured by the incumbent landlord without the interposition of an unnecessary sale. To be sure, someone would have to take some measure
of the monopoly power, but if one takes a region that extends beyond Goleta, the HHI index, of relevance in Midkiff would be very
low, so that the radical restrictions on rates count much more as confiscation of appreciation than the suppression of monopoly behavior.
Once again, Justice O'Connor's effort to walk the fine line has ended
in shipwreck. Balancing does not work when the relevant precedents are way off line.

103. Professor Sax wrote in a brief: "The property interest that petitioners claim was taken
by the Escondido Ordinance is the product of the park owner's economic power over homeowners. That power grows out of immobility, not out of the natural force of supply and demand, and is thus a species of monopoly after the fact." Brief of Golden State Mobilehome
Owners League, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (No. 90-1947), reprinted in 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1259, 1269
(1992), discussed in Epstein, supra note 49, at 7.
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The second of Justice O'Connor's regulatory takings case is Lingle
v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.1 04 Lingle offers yet another window into the
vexed interaction between the law of leases and the law of takings.105
Lingle involved a constitutional challenge to Hawaii Act 257,106 which
was fortunately repealed shortly after the Supreme Court's decision
came down.10 7 The Hawaii statute, which sustained an attack by local gasoline station operators against Chevron and other out-of-state
oil companies, represented the worst in local protectionism. The carefully crafted ordinance imposed restrictions on the rent increases that
the Chevron could demand from its tenants; it removed the ability to
terminate a lessee at the expiration of a term, and it blocked Chevron
from putting in new gas stations near to those of an incumbent dealer.
First the District Court and then the Ninth Circuit struck down the
statute on the ground that it did not advance its stated purpose of
lowering the price of gasoline to Hawaiian consumers-this, on the
sensible conclusion that dealers who seek to entrench themselves
are not likely to pass along savings to consumers.
The basis for these lower court decisions is found in a single sentence in Agins v. City of Tiburon,1 08 which states that a government
regulation of private property should be treated as though it "effects
a taking if [that regulation] does not substantially advance legitimate state interests."1 09 That proposition is clearly useless in the
form that it is provided, for at a minimum it does not distinguish
between cases that raise police power versus those that raise public
use issues. In Agins, moreover, the test was put to the worst possible purpose by validating an ordinance that set the minimum lot
size in Tiburon at five acres, thereby stripping from its owner the
substantial value that could be derived from subdividing the property. In Lingle, however, the internal inconsistencies of the formula
were of little consequence because both courts below did the sensible
thing in striking down a statute that, in effect, stripped Chevron of
many of its negotiated rights under the lease, which constitutes a
clear taking of private property.
104. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
105. For a fuller account of the case, see Richard A. Epstein, From Penn Central to Lingle:
The Long Backwards Road, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 593 (2007).
106. HAW. REV. STAT. § 486H-10.4 (2006).
107. 2006 HAW. SESS. LAWS 78 (signed by the Governor on May 5, 2006).
108. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1979).
109. Id. at 260.
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In writing her opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice
O'Connor reversed and remanded the decision below for reconsideration under the tripartite balancing test that Justice Brennan had
earlier developed in Penn Central. In her view, the central task was
to explain why asking only whether an ordinance substantially advances legitimate state interests does not capture the full range of
relevant considerations, including most critically the comparison of
benefits and burdens of the regulation that Penn Central requires.
Unfortunately, what is missing from her opinion is any willingness
to ask whether the Penn Central formula actually makes sense in a
case of this sort, where it decidedly does not.
As with Midkiff and Yee, the first question to ask is whether the
ordinance in question stripped the lessor of rights under the lease,
which of course it did. At this point, it hardly matters whether we
think of this case as a physical taking of the property or a mere
regulation of its operation, for in neither case is there any sensible
public-regarding justification for imposing these regulations. The
regulation is a straight wealth transfer between the two parties,
with negative consequences on consumers. It thus falls outside any
sensible account of the police power. What is totally unclear in this
instance is how the Penn Central formula would even apply to this
situation, with its elusive invocation of "investment-backed expectations" that only deflects the inquiry for the constitutional question
of whether the government has taken private property. In the end,
therefore, this decision shows Justice O'Connor's strengths and weaknesses. Working within the established tradition, she is able to demolish one useless strand of takings jurisprudence. But once that is
done, she refuses to make waves. Instead, she does not critique the
Penn Central formula; nor does she indicate how it might apply to
the question at hand. The law of takings faces its greatest challenges in dealing with the state reconfiguration of divided interests
in property-recall that Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon"'o dealt with
the creation of an easement of subjacent support. A comprehensive
law of takings has to be able to treat these cases by something other
than the "ad hoc" Penn Central rules. But those larger theoretical
questions are, regrettably, passed by in silence.
110. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
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III. RETROACTIVE LEGISLATIONCONNOLLY AND EASTERN ENTERPRISES

The influence of the Penn Central decision has been felt not only
in leases and land use regulation, but also with the general area of
retroactive legislation. As a matter of general legal theory, retroactive legislation has always been a keen concern because it imposes
obligations on individuals for which they were given no opportunity
to conform."' The protection of individuals against that kind of
legislation imposes major limitations on what a government can do
to its citizens. Yet at the same time, the proposition limits the way
in which government can act in order to deal with what it regards
as its past mistakes. It should therefore come as no surprise that
the post-New Deal tendency has been to relax constraints on retroactive applications.11 2 That issue first reached the Supreme Court
in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn,1 1 3 which dealt with new burdens imposed on employers to fund a black lung disease program. Justice
Marshall said, "[I]t may be that the liability imposed by the Act for
disabilities suffered by former employees was not anticipated at the
time of actual employment. But our cases are clear that legislation
readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations."1 14 That "solely" carries a lot of
weight. That same logic came to the fore in Connolly v. PensionBenefit GuarantyCorp., where the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 ("MPPAA")"
and unanimously held that neither the due process nor the Takings
Clause prevented a bait and switch.1 1 6 Individual firms were lured
into membership in the PBGC with the promise that they could
withdraw at any time, no strings attached. Then when the financial
111. For discussion, see, for example, LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1966).
112. See, e.g., Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
113. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (effectively overruling Alton).
114. Id. at 16.
115. 94 Stat. 1208, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461 (1980).
116. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986). See also Andrea L.
Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II: Takings as
Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53 (1990)
(arguing that Justice O'Connor's view in Connolly stands for the proposition that in takings
cases "A not only must establish that the generalization of wrongdoing was unreasonable, but
she also must establish that the lawmakers' judgment of wrongdoing was unreasonable as
applied to her particular case .... ).
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obligations incurred by the Board ballooned, Congress amended the
original statute so as to allow withdrawal only upon payment of a
fee designed to reflect their "unfunded vested benefits" share of the
liabilities for the program. The Supreme Court gave great weight to
Turner Elkhorn, rejected the categorical test for compensation outlined in Armstrong v. United States,117 and applied the usual balancing test of Penn Central to the case." 8 It then dismissed these
challenges on the ground that "[p]rudent employers then had more
than sufficient notice not only that pension plans were currently regulated, but also that withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial obligations."11 9 To be forewarned is, therefore, to be forearmed.
Viewed as of the time of the new legislation, Congress only sought
to insulate the public at large from having to pay money to support
the worker claims to these pension benefits. But the decision not to
put this cost on the public at large rests on the view that they were
not accountable for the losses in question. Neither, of course, were
the companies who wanted to get out of the plan. The difficulty here
with the "notice" variation is that each round of legislation makes
it easier for the next to similarly renege on earlier promises. In the
end, this cycle demeans the credibility of the United States. Therefore, in the future, it will become harder to get people to join government programs. In addition, the operation of all these government
programs will become just that much less careful in light of the ability to go back to the industry to fund the excesses of the program's
public administration.
To her credit, in her concurrence Justice O'Connor asked whether,
after Connolly, there were any limits that the arbitrary and capricious standard imposed on the ability of Congress to so legislate. Her
discussion, however, starts with the odd concession that "the mere
fact that legislation requires one person to use his or her assets for the
benefit of another will not establish either a violation of the Taking
Clause or the Due Process Clause,"120 without explaining why this
117. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227.
118. Id. at 225.
119. Id. at 227 ("We are far from persuaded that fairness and justice require the public,
rather than the withdrawing employers and other parties to pension plan agreements, to
shoulder the responsibility for rescuing plans that are in financial trouble."). The source of the
trouble came from the highly dubious administration of the program.
120. Id. at 228 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotations removed).
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amounts to anything other than the once-forbidden taking from A
to B. She also noted that the "readjustments" that Justice Marshall
spoke of in Turner Elkhorn could justify the imposition of any fine
or obligation on any party who is on notice that governments misbehave. In theory, the notice argument should cut in exactly the opposite direction. The foreseeability of government misbehavior explains
why strong constitutional protections are needed against government chicanery because everyone is on notice that, left unchecked,
legislatures will make easy promises at one time, and then change
the rules midstream.
In her view, however, the major doubts about retroactive liability
did not suffice to raise a facial challenge of the withdrawal provisions;
that led her to voice doubts about plans that "impose substantial retroactive burdens on employers in a manner that may drastically disrupt
longstanding expectations, and do so on the basis of a questionable
rationale that remains open to review in appropriate cases." 12 1 All
of this is sensible enough within Justice O'Connor's balanced approach to these questions. But what is lacking is any plausible theoretical explanation as to why she resists the facial challenges to
statutes. There was no question that the legislation challenged in
Connolly did transfer wealth from mining companies to the pensioners beyond what they agreed to assume. The question then is why
the amount or timing of those transfers goes to anything other than
the amount and timing of the compensation that federal government should have to provide the companies for the additional burdens that they have, without question, been forced to bear. Justice
White had insisted that it was not fair to impose these obligations
on the public, who were not part of the dispute. But nowhere does
he explain why it makes sense to empower the public to use legislation to transfer wealth from one private party to another. A strong
theory of limited government would find that the tough-mined approach to pension modification has the great virtue of stopping the
regime of false promises before it begins, precisely by making the
public pay when it wants to take from A and turn it over to B.
Justice O'Connor was true to her word, however, in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel12 2 where she was able secure the concurrences only
121. Id.
122. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). See also Barton H. Thompson Jr.,
The Allure of Consequential Fit, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1261 (2000) (discussing Eastern Enterprises
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of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Writing
for that plurality, she struck down under the Takings Clause yet
another decision by Congress, this time in the Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act of 1992,123 to intervene yet again in the employer
union disputes that had been before Congress on a more or less continuous basis since 1947. The act sought to impose additional financial obligations on coal companies long after they left the coal mining
industry. In Eastern's case, the 1992 Act sought to impose additional
liabilities for the company's actions between 1946 and 1965. That
statute was obviously retroactive, but it is by no means crystal clear
that it cuts back on legitimate expectations in some distinctive way
that the earlier statutes approved by Justice Marshall did not.
Justice O'Connor therefore held that this statute so dashed legitimate "investment-backed expectations" that Eastern was able to
overcome the presumption of validity that was set out in Turner
Elkhorn. But the distinction between the two cases was only with
respect to timing and extent of the obligations, so that all the intellectual difficulties of drawing the line between different retroactive
schemes remained.
It is here where the differences in approaches matter. Under the
categorical approach that I defended above, the 1992 CIRHBA is
just a more egregious illustration of an unconstitutional practice. If
the state were intent on going through with the plan, its budgetary
allocation would have to be greater. But since the only question was
whether it could impose these burdens, an injunction should issue
in both cases, precisely because the federal government is not willing to pony up the money from general revenues. Clearly the public
choice issues here are identical to those in Pennell. The compensation requirement attaches a price to government action and thus
induces more responsible deliberation. It is instructive to note that
Justice O'Connor could not carry the needed fifth vote, as Justice
Kennedy wrote his own due process analysis, 12 4 which fractured the
Court and thus rendered its precedential value nugatory in future
years. There is a clear object lesson: balancing tests work well if
and Connolly in the context of the degree to which "courts use the takings protections or
due process clauses to scrutinize the way in which the government allocates the costs of its
actions . .").

123. Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, 26 U.S.C. § 9701 et seq.
124. Eastern, 524 U.S. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part).
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people are in fundamental agreement. But in these pension cases
dealing with black lung disease, no such agreement was around.
The liberal justices are quite comfortable in taking money from A
and giving it to B, and they have little difficulty and less guilt in
sticking with the original decision of Justice Marshall in Turner
Elkhorn. Eastern Enterprises is a case where Justice O'Connor's diligent and conscientious effort to get half a loaf was able to do that and
no more. The Coal Act was struck down, but the ability to impose
principled limitations in future cases became a notable failure, as
the lower courts, which have little or no patience with property rights
protection seized on the fact that O'Connor's opinion commanded
only three other votes, and so was not a binding precedent.12 5
CONCLUSION

It is important to read these criticisms of Justice O'Connor's
takings jurisprudence in light of the general trajectory of takings
decisions in the Supreme Court. During her term of office, she
usually, but not always, took a more property protective decision,
the one major exception being her decision to join a Stevens majority in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council.12 6 Yet at the same time,
her two worst decisions, Midkiff and Yee, were written on behalf of
unanimous courts, which gives ample testimony to the low level of
protection that property interests receive from the Court. In the one
case in which she struck out boldly against the majority-Kelo -the
greatest obstacle that lay in her path was her own Midkiff decision.
125. See, e.g., Swisher Int'l, Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1056 (2008) ("[T]he takings
analysis is not an appropriate vehicle to challenge the power of Congress to impose a mere
monetary obligation without regard to an identifiable property interest."). Swisher involved
the imposition of taxes on manufacturers of tobacco goods to ease the costs of transition,
but its point surely does seem odd. Money must count as property, and the failure to pay
the obligation will surely result in the imposition of a judgment lien that can be levied against
specific property. The situation is not different from one in which the state says that the
private property owner need surrender only one of three parcels of property, or pay cash equal
to its amount. Note too that if there is no property interest here, how then can the due process clause be implicated when it too applies only to the interest that any person has in
"life, liberty or property"? Swisher itself involved a set of transition payments for farmers
who were being stripped of their massive agricultural subsidies. Why anyone should receive
any subsidy for being forced to give up an undeserved benefit previously obtained is not made
clear in the opinion.
126. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002).
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My disappointment with Justice O'Connor thus applies to the entire Supreme Court. The objections are both doctrinal and practical.
At the doctrinal level, there is simply no sustained effort to reconcile
three pairs of opposites that work their way through all the cases.
First, in some cases the Supreme Court follows the Armstrong
test so that disproportionate burdens are the measure of compensation. The "Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... [is] designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole."12 7 In other cases, it follows the "ad hoc" exception to it
found in Penn Central. Invoke the first sentence, and compensation
follows. Invoke the second, and the compensation disappears.
Second, in some cases, the Supreme Court speaks of the wrong of
government taking from A and giving to B announced in Calder v.
Bull.12 8 In other cases, the key line is that of Usery stating "our cases
are clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not
unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations." 12 9
The only way to readjust burdens, of course, is to take from A and
give to B, a risk of which everyone is on notice.
Third, in Midkiff, any "conceivable" public purpose allows a taking to go forward, a proposition that she and the dissenters explicitly rejected in Kelo.
Take the more restrictive of each of these three propositions, and
the law of takings will be in pretty good shape. Take the more deferential half, and it is not. Unfortunately, the more an issue appears
to matter, the more likely it is that the Supreme Court will take the
wrong path unaware of the social dislocations that its decisions
create. Quite simply, its decisions have introduced a vast gulf between the system of private property that operates in private disputes and the odd jumble of property rights that is fashioned to ease
the path to state domination in all manner of land use issues. Once
property is divided, the individual pieces consistently receive less
protection than does the whole. That weakened level of protection
allows courts to make the claim that a mere diminution in value
from the partial restriction on property rights does not give rise to
a compensable event.
127. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
128. Calder, 3 U.S. 386. See supra Part I.
129. Usery, 428 U.S. at 16.
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At this point, the Court supplies an instructional manual for
legislatures to destroy valuable interests in property without having
to own up to the financial consequences for their decisions. It is not
as though the protection of private property from all forms of regulation is contrary to some larger social interest. Quite the contrary,
the only way to protect that social interest in prosperity is to protect
the private building blocks that make this possible. The many artifices that are used to defend rent control laws freeze property in
its current use, without taking into account the losses that are imposed on those who are not allowed to rent or buy property when it
is subject to what amounts to a perpetual lease in favor of the sitting tenant. Those social losses reduce the wealth of the community,
the opportunities for advancement, and the size of the tax base. Yet
notwithstanding these serious allocative losses, the Supreme Court,
Justice O'Connor included, shows too much deference to political institutions whose capacity for misbehavior is all too apparent. It is
not that one asks the Justices to invent property protections where
none exist. It would be quite sufficient for them to enforce the protections that do, or at least, did exist, instead of whittling them away
with a set of distinctions that lack any intellectual coherence. In the
end, we are all losers from this sorry overall performance in the area
of the constitutional protection of property rights.

